Abstract. This article explores cinematic boredom. It investigates how feature films exemplify prevailing cultural attitudes towards boredom, and suggests that dominant cinemaÕs fear of being ÔboringÕ reflects a cultural refusal to address the implications of time passing. Most feature films kill time. The article analyses how and why they do so, and then explores what happens when a film refuses to kill time. By engaging with temporality, a film may risk being called ÔboringÕ but it may also perform the important cultural role of encouraging us to reflect on the limited time-span of our own lives.
This article investigates how films engage with, and exemplify cultural attitudes towards, boredom. When used of a film or other cultural product, the term ÔboringÕ typically implies low artistic quality. But does this negative use of the term perhaps tell us more about capitalist cultureÕs apprehensive attitude towards boredom than about the ÔboringÕ object itself? In this article, I attempt partially to rehabilitate boredom as an integral element of the taking of time to engage with time. In this, I take my lead from a series of lectures by Martin Heidegger entitled
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. One might imagine that a hundred pages on the subject by Heidegger would itself constitute the ne plus ultra of boredom. Instead, I believe that his discussion of boredom as a relation to time provides a useful, and perhaps even interesting, basis for exploring it in relation to the time-based medium of film. I begin by summarising and glossing HeideggerÕs discussion of boredom, and then feed his ideas into an analysis of how films engage Ð or fail to engage Ð with temporality. I focus in particular on two types of film: those that kill time, and those that bore to death. (Heidegger 1995, 83) .
According to this taxonomy, ÔboringnessÕ is a property of an object; it acts on us in the form of the experience of Ôbecoming bored byÕ or Ôbeing bored withÕ; through this experience, the object provokes in us a mood of ÔboredomÕ. In other words, boringness is a primary quality, and is an objective characteristic (Heidegger 1995, 84) . Boredom is a secondary quality, like colour, and is subjective (Heidegger 1995, 84) . Boringness causes boredom.
Though intuitive, the above taxonomy is rather simplistic. Unsurprisingly, Heidegger immediately problematises it. He asks, for example: ÔAre these three pieces which belong together? Or is it merely [1.] and [2.] which belong together? Or are they in general one and the same, in each case seen from a different perspective?Õ (Heidegger 1995, 83) . The answer is that we cannot be sure. As Heidegger notes, distinguishing between boringness and boredom gets us nowhere: ÔFor as soon as we start with what is boring, we will find ourselves saying: it is whatever bores us and thus causes boredomÕ (Heidegger 1995, 83 ).
Heidegger then suggests that if it is only possible to apprehend seemingly objective phenomena such as ÔboringnessÕ through subjective experience, then we must first consider the subjective experience itself Ð boredom (Heidegger 1995, 83 ). Perhaps it is even possible to assert the primacy of boredom over boringness by suggesting that Ôproperties do no accrue to things themselves but are representations, ideas that we as subjects transfer onto objectsÕ (Heidegger 1995, 85) . When bored by a film, for example, we may say that the film is boring.
Asserting boringness becomes a means of simultaneously concealing and lending weight to our subjective response of boredom. Perhaps the assertion of boringness is little more than a form of self-defence, an assertion that it is not our fault we were bored, but the fault of the work.
i Perhaps, in short, boringness is a construct. It is certainly true that assertions of objectsÕ boringness are often coded expressions of boredom. But can we go so far as to say that boringness does not exist? Heidegger suggests that we cannot. When we regard an object as boring, there must be something about it that prompts us to experience boredom in relation to that particular object and not another; there must be something of the boring within it (Heidegger 1995, 85 ). Yet asserting that boredom and boringness are distinct phenomena is also inadequate, as it cannot resolve the contradiction that Ô[c]haracteristics such as ÔboringÕ… belong to the object and yet are taken form the subjectÕ (Heidegger 1995, 86 ).
Heidegger instead posits that a boring thing Ôdoes not cause the boredom, yet nor does it receive it merely as something attributed by the subject. In short:
boredom … is a hybrid, partly objective, partly subjectiveÕ (Heidegger 1995, 88 (Heidegger 1995, 113) . ÔBecoming bored byÕ involves an immediate experience of boredom in a specific situation; HeideggerÕs example is that of waiting for four hours in a rural railway station Ð as one waits, one becomes bored by the wait (Heidegger 1995, 94) . ÔBeing bored withÕ describes a form of attunement that is not focused on the present moment, and that involves a degree of detachment from the boring thing.
It is typified by being at a dinner party, having a good time, but subsequently feeling that the whole evening was empty and valueless (Heidegger 1995, 109) .
ii In this article, I shall focus primarily on the immediate experience of Ôbecoming bored by somethingÕ. The something that I shall focus on is films.
Time must pass for us to become bored by something. (Heidegger 1995, 91 
Killing time
Boredom is something that we typically seek to ÔescapeÕ (Heidegger 1995, 78) .
Films provide the ÔescapismÕ through which this can be achieved. They typically focus on fictional lives, allowing us to escape from our own, and fill their duration (and our time) with action: process-based activities, characters pursuing goals, dramatic confrontations, complex plots, and so on. This is the form of escape that Siegfried Kracauer criticises in his brief but evocative article, Boredom.
KracauerÕs view of boredom, like HeideggerÕs, is (perhaps excessively) celebratory. He sees it as pure untapped potential: ÔIn the evening one saunters through the streets, replete with an unfulfillment from which a fullness could sproutÕ (Kracauer 1995, 332) . However, instead of engaging creatively with our boredom, we are distracted by the sights and sounds of city streets. Prominent among these are advertisements, which may in turn lure us into a movie theatre.
Once we have settled in front of a cinema screen, we allow a film to pass time for us: ÔOne forgets oneself in the presence of gawking, and the huge dark hole is animated with the illusion of a life that belongs to no one and exhausts everyone (Kracauer 1995, 332) . Cinema fills the Ôhuge dark holeÕ of the auditorium and of our lives with the sounds and images of fictional lives, thereby preventing us from finding fulfillment within ourselves, and paradoxically leaving us feeling empty. It also offers another form of escape, namely escape from feeling time passing.
Though train stations are indifferent about the effect imposed duration has on us, film-makers are not. Most films provide us with something to do to pass time Ð hence the appeal of watching films on long-haul flights and train journeys.
Heidegger notes that in escaping the feeling of time passing, we Ôkill timeÕ (Heidegger 1995, 93) . We kill time because when we find something to do in order to pass time, time does not pass more quickly, rather it is completely annulled Ð we do not notice it passing at all (Heidegger 1995, 99) . Train stations, like films, also impose duration, and so are also privileged sites of boredom. HeideggerÕs description of Ôthe tasteless station of some lonely minor railwayÕ is worth citing at length here:
It is four hours until the next train arrives …. We read the timetables or study the table giving the various distances from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with at all. We look at the clock Ð only a quarter of an hour has gone by. Then we go out onto the local road. We walk up and down, just to have something to do. But it is no use. Then we count the trees along the road, look at our watch again Ð exactly five minutes since we last looked at it. (Heidegger 1995, 93) Everywhere we look in a train station, we see clocks and screens displaying departure times, encouraging us to quantify how much longer we will be held in limbo. But to do so is a mistake, as time slows when we count it down.
Though they are surrounded by reminders of time passing, instead of quantifying time, LeoneÕs gunmen find ways to kill it. Each does so in a slightly different way.
One feels time passing physically by means of drops of water dripping on his hat, quantifying the duration of his wait like the ticking of a clock quantifies time. He kills time by incorporating the dripping into a fastidious process: he allows water to fill the rim of his hat, carefully raises the hat, and drinks from it without spilling a drop. The second attempts to kill time by snoozing, but a ticking telegraph machine disturbs his nap, so he rips out its wires. Then a buzzing fly lands on his face, so he kills time by setting himself the goal of getting rid of it without moving his hands. This activity does not yield the desired result, so he finds a new form of distraction Ð he traps the fly in the barrel of his pistol, entertaining himself with the echoing sound of it buzzing around. Perhaps the most interesting response to time passing, however, is that of the third killer, to whom Leone gives the least screen time. The third killer does not kill time through action. He just stands at the side of the track, looking into the distance and waiting. As he does so, the camera remains motionless, and the scene approaches the stillness of a photograph. Accompanying this stillness is the rhythmic creaking of the rotating blades of a windmill on the station platform. The creaking again quantifies time like the ticking of a clock, but the killer remains indifferent and does nothing.
The opening of Once Upon a Time in the West is a virtuosic evocation of time passing. However, for most of its duration, the sequence kills time with action. The unusual miniature activities of hat water drinking and fly baiting are magnified by LeoneÕs close-ups, and become widescreen spectacle. The stillness of the sequence also serves to build suspense. This is a self-reflexive western, so we know (and Leone knows we know) that there will be a shoot-out when the train finally arrives. Though the killersÕ progress is temporarily stilled at the station, they are nonetheless on a journey that will end with someone being killed. In the meantime, they pass time in various entertaining ways. But ultimately, by killing time, LeoneÕs killers hasten their own death. When the train finally arrives, they do not have time to kill their intended victim, because he is a faster shot, so they are killed. With hindsight, we see that they have in fact been in limbo, waiting for their own death.
If a film makes us forget about time passing, it provides entertainment.
The opening of Once Upon a Time in the West constitutes a brilliant entertainment that simultaneously presents us with the passing of time and provides us with an escape from it. When we watch an entertaining film, the passing of the time of our lives is annulled by the passing of time within the film.
Director Andrzej Wajda recounts a conversation on this theme:
Many years ago when I made my film Ashes and Diamonds [1958] , a very long two-part work, I was afraid of the publicÕs reaction. I expressed my fear to a Polish writer who said to me, ÔWhat IÕd like to see you make is a film so long IÕd never have to leave the theater.Õ (Wajda 1989, 114) WajdaÕs friend wanted to see a film that provided him with a permanent escape from the passing time of his life. Kracauer, of course, would regard this escape as a bad thing. A constant escape from boredom would bring about a kind of selferadication. In a beautiful conceit, Kracauer does not associate absence with boredom, in the form of absence of activity, fun, and so on; rather, he associates it with activity, in the form of absence from ourselves: ÔIf one were never bored, one would presumably not really be present at all and would thus be merely one more object of boredom…Õ (Kracauer 1995, 334) . Of course, the option of never being bored is impossible. There is no mode of travel that does not involve waiting, and no film that lasts a lifetime. WajdaÕs friend sought a film that would offer him a permanent escape from himself. But he could not find one. Instead, he chose the only remaining option: he killed himself.
WajdaÕs example demonstrates why, in my view, Kracauer goes too far in celebrating boredom. In particular, his suggestion that the best thing to do is Ôhang about in the train station or, better yet, stay at home, draw the curtains, and surrender oneself to oneÕs boredom on the sofaÕ seems altogether too glib (Kracauer 1995, 334) . I agree with Kracauer that boredom can be a valuable experience and even a creative force. But it can also be dangerous. Boredom can bring us face-to-face not just with ourselves but with the emptiness of our lives. Boredom foregrounds the passing of time, and reminds us that our waiting will eventually end not with a train arriving but with death. Magnus Aronson notes that to be aware of passing time is to face our mortality and the shortness of the time-span of our lives (2002). When we sit bored at a train station, like the killers in Once Upon a Time in the West, we count down time until we will die.
ÔBecoming bored byÕ
If a film kills time, then we do not feel bored while watching, though we may still afterwards look back on the experience and be left feeling empty as a result; in this case, we experience the retrospective state of Ôbeing bored withÕ something.
Alternatively, a film may fail to kill time. If this occurs, then we feel time passing and may become bored by it. ÔBecoming bored byÕ a film relates both to its duration and to the time killing options it offers within that duration. Lars
Svendsen suggests that it is not the length of the imposed duration that relates to our Ôbecoming bored byÕ but the pace at which time passes:
In boredom, time is slow, and because of this slowness we notice that we are not in charge of time, that we are subject to time. We attempt to drive away this power by means of our everyday pastimes … We seek to be occupied because it liberates us from the emptiness of boredom. When we manage to stay fully occupied, time disappears in favour of whatever fills it.Õ (Svendsen 2005, 118) Though SvendsenÕs summary of the relationship between boredom and slowness is hard to fault, he skips over HeideggerÕs crucial point that we become bored by something Ônot because the progress of time is slow, but because it is too slowÕ (Heidegger 1995, 97) . The italicised ÔtooÕ reminds us that Ôbecoming bored byÕ is a subject-object relation, and so is also dependent on our expectations. Heidegger elaborates as follows: ÔBoredom is only possible at all because each thing, as we say, has its time. If each thing did not have its time, then there would be no boredomÕ (Heidegger 1995, 105) . This is a crucial point.
Boredom occurs when there is a mismatch between our time and an objectÕs time. (Heidegger 1995, 132) .
ÔProfound BoredomÕ is the kind of boredom that Kracauer aspires towards in his article. It involves reconciling ourselves to, and even embracing, the emptiness that exists within and beyond the limited time of our lives. Being bored to death is not a morbid attitude, however. In fact, it is profoundly ethical. It involves an appreciation of the fact that time is not under our control, and that we cannot actually Ôkill timeÕ at all. Time passes, we die, and time continues to pass.
Appreciating this fact makes us better equipped to appreciate the various temporalities that exist beyond our own. It allows us to appreciate, as Heidegger puts it, that Ôeach thing, as we say, has its time (Heidegger 1995, 105) . After a while, the engineer adapts to village life and stops asking about the progress of the old woman. Being bored to death does not, however, preclude taking action to save life. Towards the end of The Wind Will Carry Us, an accident suddenly motivates the engineer into action. A villager becomes trapped in a hole on the hill where the engineer receives his phone calls. When faced with the possibility of the villagerÕs untimely death, the engineer drives at high speed back down the hill, finds a group of villagers, and lets them know about the accident. Following a brief sequence in which he seems not to realise that his jeep is the only means by which a rescue mission can take place, he lends it to some villagers, who race up the hill to save the man. As the filmÕs sole narrative vehicle drives off into the distance, the engineer returns to village time. He talks to the doctor who treated the injured man, and persuades him to look in on the old woman.
The Wind Will Carry Us neither entertains nor leaves a feeling of emptiness afterwards. Indeed, by allowing us to watch the engineer learn to give the villagers the time they deserve, and by playing out KiarostamiÕs own attunement to the temporality of his non-professional actors (as demonstrated, for example, by his use of long takes), the film allows us also to attune ourselves to the villagersÕ temporality. In doing so, it shows itself, in my view, to be profoundly ethical. Of course, in doing so, the film also risks being called ÔboringÕ.
But by failing to give people and things their time, cinema risks far more.
i This assertion, in a sense, is the inverse of the dreaded parental reproach that there are no boring things just boring people, which implies that by finds an object boring, the child is in fact demonstrating not the objectÕs boringness but her or his own propensity towards boredom, and thus her or his own boringness. By contrast, the above assertion posits that there are no boring things, and no boring people either, just boredom.
ii Heidegger refers to Ôbecoming bored byÕ as ÔThe First Form of BoredomÕ (Heidegger 1995, 78) . He refers to Ôbeing bored withÕ as ÔThe Second Form of BoredomÕ (Heidegger 1995, 106) . There is also a third form of boredom, which Heidegger labels ÔProfound BoredomÕ (Heidegger 1995, 132) . This is a more essential form of boredom, which transcends time (Heidegger 1995, 144) . Because it exists separately from time, this form of boredom does not have a privileged relationship with cinema, and so I do not discuss it in detail.
iii Clearly, in the context of domestic viewing, when playback time is controllable by the viewer, there is an extra variable at work. The potential for an individual film or television show to bore is diminished, though there still remains potential for Ôbecoming bored byÕ and Ôbeing bored withÕ the overall experience of watching television all evening. iv Kracauer also refers to killing time, though he does so without reference to film (Kracauer 1995, 93) . v Conversely, entertainment occurs when there is a fit between the speed at which a film moves and the speed at which we want it to move. Most screenwriters and directors aspire towards achieving such a fit. Screenwriting Ôhow-toÕ manuals are essentially instruments for structuring the way in which a film Ôpasses timeÕ, and for reconciling the speed of filmsÕ narratives with viewersÕ expectations. vi The association between slowness and boredom raises some seemingly paradoxical questions. For example: ÔWe pass the time, in order to master it, because time becomes long in boredom. Time becomes long for us. Is it supposed to be short, then? Does not each of us wish for a truly long time for ourselves? And whenever it does become long for us, we pass the time and ward off its becoming long!Õ (Heidegger 1995, 80) . In fact, this not quite the paradox it seems to be. As Magnus Aronson notes, the same phenomena may trigger boredom in some contexts and not others. In some contexts, for example, slowness, repetition, and lack of information may bore; in others, they may give pleasure, for example: Ôslowness in the sexual act, repetition in music, lack of information in a minimalist interior and lack of events during a boat trip down a beautiful riverÕ (2002) . vii Our expectations of the speed at which films should move has also increased: we watch films more intelligently than before, we make connections quicker, cover narrative ground faster, and typically expect films to do the same. As a result, there is much more opportunity than ever before for films to drag, and for us to become bored by them. viii Long duration shots can also be used to engage with speed as well as slowness. For example, the climax of Atanarjuat (Zacharias Kunuk, 2001 ) follows an Inuit runner sprinting for many kilometres, trying to outrun a lynch mob. The sequence lasts a long time both in the filmÕs diegetic time and in its running time. Its long duration shots allow us to appreciate the runnerÕs astonishing stamina in a way that the fast cutting of a typical action movie could not.
